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The nationalist and reformist policies of the Peruvian
Military Government have elicited great interest in the deve-
loping world. The Peruvian Military have increasingly followed
a more autonomous foreign policy V18-a-t'i8 the United States,
of which the more dramatic examples are the International
Petroleum Company (IPC) controversy and the 200 miles territor-
ial waters dispute. Internally several reformist measures have
affected both certain local power groups and some powerful
foreign interests.
Among these measures are the Agrarian Reform Law, the
reorganization of the banking system, the General Law of
Industry, the Mining Law, the Teleconmiunicatioris Law, and the
forthcoming Educational Reform Law. Some implications of
these policies of economic and social change have been dis-
cussed elsewhere by Anibal Quijano.1 The Military are com-
mitted to changing not only the 'traditional' economy and
society, supposedly in the direction of a more egalitarian
distribution of rewards, but also a power structure which
they consider a natural corollary of society,
Thus, one of their stated goals is the promotion of the
political participation (also known as social mobilization
and power transference) of the 'historically marginal majority'.
This article will center on the strategic role played by the
State bureaucracy in this respect as well as on the model
of a political system which seems to be emerging from the
practice and the ideological postulates of the military
government.
David Scott Palmer, Visiting Professor in the Program of
Social Sciences of the Catholic Universiti of Peru, and Ph.D.
candidate in Government at Cornell University.
Jorge Rodriguez Beruff, Graduate Student of the University of
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Belaunde: The Failure of the Party System
The Armed Forces intervened early in the 1960's in order to
place President Belaunde and his Accion Popular party in power.
Despite this military backing, Belaunde was unable to overcoe
fierce Congressional opposition from a coalition of the APRA1
and the conservative right. He thus failed to satisfy the demands
for reform made by those social groups which had been historically
excluded from the political system but whose expectations had been
raised by The Belaunde Program.
In a study on the guerrilla movement of 1965, the military
diagnosed, not incorrectly, that Peru had entered a period of
'latent subversion'. The economic crisis of 1967 and the worsening
of the inflationary process, the first in 15 years, further re-
duced public confidence in the capacity of existing institutions
either to effect needed reforms or to ensure a degree of economic
stability. The steps taken to face the crisis were far from popular.
The coalition of all the main political forces under a conser-
vative platform (known as the 8px'convivencia) in the last 100
days of the Belaunde Government and a 40% devaluation of the
currency only accelerated the decline in legitimacy of the existing
institutions. The almost unbelievable incapacity of the Government
to resolve the IPC issue, which had figured prominently in
Belauride's original reform platform, confirmed to the people that
they had very little stake in maintaining this 'constitutional'
government.
The Military: The Rise of a Reformist Ideology
The decline in public confidence in Belaunde was paralleled
by a decline in the support offered to him by the Military. The
outlook of the Military themselves had undergone profound changes.
These changes placed them increasingly to the left of APRA, their
traditional foe, which had, since 1956, clearly adopted conserva-
tive positions to obtain the favour of the United. States and the
dominant social groups.
This reorientation of military thinking had first appeared in
the form of a concern about the relationship between the 'national
potential' and security and, therefore, of the need for industri-
alization and economic growth. The academic elite of the Centro
de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM) played a central role in the
formulation and popularization of these ideas among the officer
corps during the fifties.
1
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana.
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After the Cuban Revolution, the attention of the military
shifted to internal security, reinforced by French and American
military doctrines of civic action and antisubversive war, and
the need to reform in order to stem revolutionary activity.
The Military were indeed aware of and worried about the growing
mobilization of popular groups. The rural movement led by ¡-lugo
Blanco, the establishment of three guerrilla fronts, the in-
crease in unrest among the urban working class and middle class
students showed them that a repetition of the Cuban 'cata-
strophe' might be possible in Peru. Thus within the military in-
telligence machine which was strengthened to meet the crisis,
a group of officers were reaching the same conclusions as the
academic elite of CAEM: the causes of revolt lay in the struc-
ture of Peruvian society; and repression was not a durable
answer to insurgence. Reform was necessary. As these ideas
were becoming dominant within the officer corps, Belaunde was
proving incapable of carrying out the promised changes. For
the Military the problem then became, as a prominent General
has put it, "not whether to intervene, but when". The IPC
scandal settled that problem.
The Military in Power
It is clear that the military government has benefited
greatly from the weakness of the regime that preceded it
and the decay of the old mechanisms of participation. It has
been able to formulate and implement policies without giving
serious consideration to demands coming from the old power
institutions, especially the political parties. In Peru, unlike
other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile and
Brazil, a mass-based populist movement has never reached the
top seats of political power. In addition, the country has
never experienced a fundamental social or economic reform.
For these reasons the present military government has had
a great deal of 'political space' in which to manoeuvre. It
has not had to confront serious opposition at the national
level, and by pursuing a programme of reforms it has been able
to claim legitimacy for its rather long stay in power. However,
the lack of communication between the government and the groups
it is trying to benefit may create conflicts precisely with
those groups which, it hopes, will constitute its basic
civilian support.
To discuss the present mechanisms of participation it is
necessary to distinguish between participation at the center
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and the periphery (i.e. at the national or local/sectoral
levels). We must also note the difference between partici-
pation in the posing of demands and participation in the
implementation of decisions. These distinctions are im-
portant to the understanding of present politics in Peru.
They raise the issue of whether it is possible to apply
uncritically an "input-output" model when the bureaucracy
is far from the Weberian 'ideal' and far from politically
neutral.
Conflict at the Center and the Bureaucratic Representation
of Interests
Anibal Quijano has characterized the power structure
that emerged after the 1968 coup as a military-bureaucratic
coalition, emphasizing a community of interest between the
dominant reformist group of officers and the technocrati-
cally oriented bureaucrats in the higher echelons of public
admijistration. We consider it more fruitful, however, to
look at the cleavages and conflicts within the bureaucracy
and their relation to the problem of participation. It is
true that bureaucratic conflict occurs within certain li-
mits: those dictated by the 'permanent interests' of the
bureaucracy itself. But, as we will illustrate, conflict
does occur (it may have been greatly magnified after the
coup) and affects the formation and implementation of
policy.
The legitimacy of traditional mechanisms of participa-
tion (i.e. parties and pressure groups), as we have seen,
had suffered severely during the Belaunde government. After
the coup they proved incapable of dealing with the ruling
military elite. The politically active groups, therefore,
unable to make their demands heard through traditional
channels, sought to control or influence the bureaucracy.
This produced a shift in the area of conflict and increased
the strategic importance of public administration.
There are two factors that contribute, in the case of
the Peruvian bureaucracy, to the politicalization of its
members and to the intensification of internal conflicts.
First, access to it was based in the past on political
clientelisin, so it resembles more an agglomeration of
various superimposed 'ideological' groups (Pradista, Belaun-
dista, Aprista) than a homogeneous 'modern' bureaucracy
manned by career functionaries. Secondly, the Military are
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torn between the conflicting goals of obtaining a high
degree of ideological homogeneity within the ruling 'team'
and of maintaining the institutional unity of the Armed
Forces. The result has been a compromise: there have been
purges of some right wing and some left wing ministers, yet
a degree of pluralism at the level of the Council of Ministers
has been maintained. The military personnel assigned to the
Ministries reflect this diversity of political persuasions
and soon identify their ideological reference groups within
the civilian bureaucracy.
The different bureaucratic groups seek to legitimize
their positions by identifying with those sectors of the
ruling 'team' and of the military personnel assigned to the
Ministries who are closest to them ideologically. The form
in which directives from the center (Presidency, Council
of Ministers) are interpreted and implemented is determined
by the coalitions and power relations of the various factions
at the ministerial level. The ties between competing groups
that sometimes occur result in the ininobilization of the
administration which is perceived higher up either as 'lack
of morality' (corruption) or as open sabotage by opposition
elements.
Although conflict within the bureaucracy may sometimes
not be conciously political, its results are clearly so, since
the form in which the decisions are implemented or simply not
put into effect is of political concern to the groups outside
the State structure who are affected by them. These groups
do perceive the political implications of the conflict and
try to benefit from it, for example, by putting pressure on
those ministries most directly related to their interest.
The enterpreneurial and working class groups aim at control-
ling or influencing the Labour Ministry; the Church, the
private schools and the teachers put pressure on the Ministry
of Education, and so on.
It should be noted that the Peruvian State structure is
highly centralized and that not all politically active groups
have access to the middle or higher levels of the lineno
bureaucracy. Their exclusion from this form of struggle may
stem either from geographical reasons or from their relative
lack of weight vie-a-vis other nationally organised groups.
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Contact Points and Extraordinary Forms of Demand
The relationship of the average citizen to the political
system under military government may be interpreted in terms
of a 'corporatist model'. This model has three major compo-
nents. The first is the ability of the citizen to express and
resolve daily concerns through participation in functional
groupings, such as neighbourhood committees, industrial com-
munities, agricultural cooperatives and peasant communities.
The second is constituted by the opportunities available to
influence the way in which decisions made at the center are
implemented. This can be accomplished either by working
through the 'normal channels' of the local contact points of
government agencies or by the use of 'extraordinary escape
mechanisms' such as clientelism, delegations, marches, strikes
and land invasions, to influence individuals and/or agencies
higher up in the government hierarchy. The third component of
the model of military corporatism is the centralization of
control and the asymmetrical process of 'government-down'
mechanisms.
Participation by the citizen does indeed take place, but
almost exclusively within the 'government-down', or
process. Local concerns are worked out within local partici-
pation units. When citizens wish to affect the way in which
decisions are made at the center or implemented through the
bureaucracy, their leaders work through the local or sectoral
contact points of government. Insofar as local contact points
prove unresponsive, local particiaption units express their
concerns through 'extraordinary' mechanisms. These mechanisms
do not ordinarily include traditional power organizations such
as pressure groups or political parties. This is due to the
disrepute into which the normal input mechanisms fell during
the years preceeding the most recent coup, and the conscious
attempt by the military government since then to eliminate
their influence as institutional input groups. To quote one of
many official references, "The only thing political parties
could do well was what they did badly". Such organization
among local units which does take place occurs within functi-
onal areas. The official view is that this serves to protect
the members from the 'corrupting' influence of outside enti-
ties such as parties, and helps them to coordinate the pre-
sentation of their concerns at local contact points.
These trends point to the rise of a model of polities
significantly different from that dominant before 1968. A
number of cases suggest, however, the difficulties which the
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military government of Peru is experiencing in its attempt to
make operative the corporatist model of politics.
Friction within the Bureaucratic 'Transmission Belts'
One example is the way in which decisions are made in the
upper bureaucracy of the central government. This process re-
veals the degree to which lingering resistance to change
orients Large segments of the entrenched bureaucracy. A parti-
cularly suggestive example is to be found within the Ministry
of Education, where an alliance between the Vice-Minister (a
Colonel) and entrenched bureaucrats has succeeded in domina-
ting a group of CAEM - trained officers from the influential
Ministerial Advisory Council. These officers, who were work-
ing for a educational reform have been routinely
rotated and replaced by a less experienced group. The
Educational Reform Law was passed in March 1972. It is
being implemented by precisely that sector of the bureaucracy
least interested in innovation or in changing the established
routine and priveleges.
Failure of the 'Local Contact Points' of Government
A. The Huanta Massacre, 1969
A second case refers to the employment of 'escape mecha-
nisms' after successive efforts to influence local contact
points early in the military government failed. This is the
protest in June 1969 in the sierra provinces of Huanta and
Ayacucho over the promulgation and attempted implementation
of a law which would have ended free schooling for any students
of secondary school who failed a course (The law provided
for a payment of about £1 per month per course failed. Minimum
wage in the province is about 30p per day). A temporary alli-
ance of students, parents, and peasants succeeded in forcing
the central government to revoke the law, but only after
taking over city of Huanta and provoking the national guard
assault force into killing 18 and wounding 100 of them.
It was apparent in this case that the government contact
points at the local level - school directors, the police, and
the sub-prefect - failed to give the central government an
accurate assessment regarding the strength of mass opposition
to the law. As a result, central government did not fully per-
ceive the needs of that segment of the population (the lower
classes) which would have been the most adversely affected by
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the measure. Moreover, the local contact points in this
example, had neither the power to change the law, nor, from
all appearances, the skill to reconcile citizen opposition.
As a result, citizens were forced to resort to extreme mea-
sures to demonstrate their hostility to the new law. The first
response of the central government was to send in troops to
settle the matter by force. The magnitude of the miscalcula-
tion became clear after a large number of people had been
killed and the nation made dramatically aware of the depth
of the problem. On June 24, 1969, the same day as the Agrarian
Reform Law was decreed (which may indicate where national
government's attention had been focussed during the build-up
of the crisis in Huanta), the obnoxious provisions of the
education law were repealed.
B. The Pamplona Invasion, 1971
A more recent example of the ambivalence of the military
government in practice toward the problem of mass participa-
tion in the political process is the massive urban land in-
vasion of Pamplona, on May Day, 1971. While the organized in-
vasion of vacant land around Lima has become a common method
for the urban poor to get their own house lot free of charge,
the Pamplona invasion was ne of the largest (an estimated
10,000 families before it was over), and the first since the
Revolutionary Military Government took office.
Only after clandestine attempts by the government to
remove the invaders by force in the pre-dawn darkness of three
successive mornings had failed, and after one citizen had been
killed (51 national police were wounded by sticks and stones),
were steps taken to recognise the new reality. The normal work
of the Ministry of Housing and the National Office for 'Young
Towns' (as the 300-odd squatter settlements have come to be
called) was completely reoriented. A new 'Young Townt, Villa
El Salvador, was created in short order, and the thousands of
men, women, and children in Pamplona were registered and then
moved there by army trucks. The government installed basic
services such as water, electricity, paved streets, and schools
within a few months. Government agency 'contact points' with
the Young Towns grew rapidly in number. From the point of view
of the citizens, one of the main reasons for the invasion in
the first place was that there was only one poorly placed
office of the National Young Towns Agency to service the con-
cerns of about a million residents.
Most previous invasions have also succeeded in obtaining
official government recognition, but only after years of
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pressure and haggling. Even though the official response in this
case was hasty, ad hoc, and chaotic, the demands of the citizens
through these 'extraordinary channels' were met. Critics noted
that one reason for the rapid response was the proximity of the
original invasion site to one of the most wealthy suburbs of
Lima. Another was the desire to avoid alienating the progressive
wing of the Catholic Church, intimately involved with work in
the Young Towns in general and Pamplona in particular. Finally,
there is some evidence of attempts within the highest levels of
the military itself to utilize the invasion as a springboard
for a realignment of power towards the right. This attempt
failed, of course, and the citizens were the principal benefi-
ciaries. Yet both the process by which they became beneficiaries
and the reasons for it suggest a continued inability by the
Military Government to keep communication channels between
citizen and government at the lower levels sufficiently open
to permit the routine channelling and resolution of concerns
from below.
Much of this difficulty arises from the way in which the
military has defined its 'revolution', They are attempting to
achieve the most difficult of objectives - to transform Peruvian
society without wholesale destruction of existing institutions
and widespread violence. There are any number of manifestations
of their attempts to reach this objective. They want to pre-
serve their attractiveness for foreign investment while elimi-
nating the worst abuses (and abusers) of the past, They want
to reduce their external dependence by diversifying it. They
want to maintain incentives for domestic private enterprise
while increasing the share of profits and of management responsi-
bilities accruing to the workers. They want to dynamize the
public sector without drastic changes in the bureaucracy en-
trusted with the implementation of public policy. All this is
co be accomplished in a context of scarce domestic resources
and continued reliance on foreign capital. Even if all their
policy initiatives were enlightened, and if they met with
immediate success in achieving their objectives, which they
have not, the abuses of the past would continue to exist for
some time side by side with these initiatives of the present.
As far as popular participation in the decision-making process
is concerned, the most difficult stumbling block lies in the
preservation of government bureaucracy and of continued limits
on that effective expression of demands at either the local
or the national levels.
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Another important reason for the difficulties facing the
present reformist government has to do with the striking con-
trast between their stated goal of local control (auto-gstio'n
or self-management) and more than 400 years of history. The
structures of government of both the Spanish Empire and Repub-
lican Peru after 1825 were extremely centralized in nature.
This characteristic has been preserved in present-day institu-
tions, whose resistance to change is enhanced by the fact that
changes are being initiated by a military institution which is
itself extremely centralized and hierarchical.
Inadequacy of Government 'Local Contact Points'
A few observations regarding the operation of the 'local
contact points' of government will illustrate the tension
between rhetoric and reality, objectives and current practice.
The government's agrarian reform program has some 300 techni-
cians on the front lines at present, known as sectoristas.
They are assigned to small geographical areas affected by
the agrarian reform, and they have responsibility for its
day-to-day implementation. In terms of the objectives of this
Revolutionary Military Government, their role is crucial.
In practice, however, these ssctorista8 are unable, for
the most part, to carry out the tasks assigned to them. They
are paid less for their efforts than any other government
employee group working for the agrarian reform except day la-
bourers and some secretaries: about £25 to £35 per month. The
level of education required for these posts is two years'
study beyond secondary school in practical agriculture. They
have been trained to solve the technical problems of agricul-
ture rather than the organizational problems of reordering
rural society, and their occupational role under the agrarian
reform is normally defined in these terms. Any organizational
skills which the sectorista brings to bear in his relations
with the peasants depend largely on the personality of the
individual. In many parts of the country they receive little
institucional support; lacking their own transportation, for
example, they must often wait for days or weeks for vital
materials or even, in extreme cases, for a lift back to their
sector of operations. The official practice of assigning per-
sonnel to areas other than that in which they were born and
raised often deprives the agrarian reform of 'contact points'
fluent in the language of the peasants with whom they work.
When one or another of the sectôristas overcomes these multiple
obstacles and does an effective job in the field for a few
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months, he is immediately rewarded by an office job at the
regional headquarters. Until these institutional obstacles
are removed, the application of the citizen-participation
model to the rural sector will continue to be fraught with
difficulties.
SINANOS and the Official Solution
Needless to say, the government is quite aware of the
magnitude of the problem of bringing about an effective
channeling of popular participation. They feel that they
have found an answer in the newly created (June, 1971; to be
operative between January and April, 1972) "National System
of Support for Social Mobilization" (SINAMOS) . The full name
is an awkward mouthful; the acronym is not (it means, "with-
out masters"). The proclaimed objective of this agency is
to stimulate participation without controlling it. According
to SINANOS director General Leonidas Rodriguez,
".... we want to stimulate and make possible the creation
of autonomous organizations through which our people may
increasingly participate in the solution of the social,
cultural, economic, political and instiutional problems
that affect their daily lives as members of society",
At the same time the aim is to coordinate the various
government agencies which deal with social mobilization in one
form or another. Under the umbrella of SINANOS, all such
agencies as the National Development Fund, the provincial
development corporations, Rural and Urban Social Promotion, the
National Cooperative and Community Development Offices, the
Peasant Communities and Peasant Organizations Offices, and
the Agrarian Reform Promotion Office. However, the actual
commitment to participation has been somewhat ambiguous.
SINANOS has coordinated efforts to bring out the crowds at
public gatherings for speeches by the President and Ministers.
They also appear to be working to stimulate the people to
organize themselves in neighbourhood committees, or coopera-
tives, or federations in order to contribute to the creation
and maintenance of a viable infrastructure of popular parti-
cipation.1 To quote General Rodriguez again:
so that the Peruvian citizens may have the opportu-
nity of participating in posing and solving problems
1 SINANOS has received a mandate to reorganize participation
along more egalitarian lines in the agricultural production
cooperatives of the North Coast sugar belt.
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related to the multiple services and needs of their
neighbourhoods, their places of work, the schools
where their children study, their function in the
economy as workers of different types, as inhabitants
of a particular territorial area and as members of a
national collectivity that confronts problems of
extremely varied nature and significance".
As we have pointed out, however, this effort to stimulate
local units of participation runs counter to the country's long
experience and present reality. It is also being carried Out by
a leadership which lacks confidence in the ability of the
common man to make decisions for himself. To what degree
national history and popular perceptions can be reversed remains
to be seen. Many observers, ourselves included, feel that the
tension between the rhetoric of the revolutionary government
and its inability, in spite of the best of intentions, to ful-
fill completely the expectations raised, will exacerbate ten-
sions in the middle term. If adequate mechanisms of participa-
tion are not firmly established in the few years during which
the present government enjoys relatively high legitimacy, po-
pular dissatisfaction will be channelled increasingly through
extra-institutional mechanisms The efforts expended in arousing
popular expectations and in teaching the people how to organize
without giving them effective voice in decisions would then
begin to haunt the ruling ¿lite, and could lead to dramatic
changes in the present course of reform in Peru.
Lima, PERU
January - February 1972
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